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ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS—WOUNDED WARRIORS AND
DUE PROCESS: THE CUSHMAN V. SHINSEKI ANALOGY
ABSTRACT
Military service members and veterans receive various benefits
arising from their military service. The Department of Veterans Affairs
acts as the trustee for distribution of these benefits upon veterans’
transition to civilian society. Among these benefits is disability
compensation for medical conditions incurred or aggravated by the
veteran in the course of their military service. This compensation makes
the veteran whole for each condition that can be traced back to the
veteran’s service. In many cases, this compensation is the veteran’s sole
source of subsistence when they return to civilian life. Until 2009, these
benefits were not considered property interests under the Due Process
Clause. But the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit changed that
in Cushman v. Shinseki, which stands for a rather simple proposition:
veterans’ benefits are constitutionally protected property interests.
The author takes the proposition presented in Cushman and seeks
to expand it to another scheme that provides disability benefits to service
members still in the military. The Department of Defense may separate
with severance pay or medically retire a member who suffers from a
medical condition which renders him or her unfit for further military
duty. The military disability benefits available to members under this
scheme lack any judicially recognized constitutional protection—despite
many shared characteristics with disability compensation provided to
veterans. The unspoken doctrine of judicial non-interference with
national defense and military matters—the military deference doctrine—
has stymied opinions like Cushman from appearing in the military
disability benefits context. The author argues this doctrine does not
apply where the military is acting as an administrator of benefits instead
of providing for the national defense. Classifying military disability
benefits as property interests does not imply national security issues.
Rather, it recognizes that the government cannot arbitrarily deprive
service members of disability benefits. The end sought by the Cushman
analogy is as simple as the proposition the case stands for: disabled
service members ought to be guaranteed a fundamentally fair
adjudication—no matter the circumstances.
161
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last forty years, the meaning of “property” under the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause has broadly expanded to include
intangible interests.1 Concurrent to the expansion of “property” was the
extension of due process protections2 to various classes of individuals,
including enemy combatants,3 corporations,4 public school students,5
welfare applicants6 and recipients,7 convicted felons,8 debtors,9 and
government employees.10
However, efforts to extend due process protections have fallen short
of reaching the members of the United States military.11 Military
adjudications have historically proceeded unabated by the specter of
1. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972) (“The Court
has [clarified] that the property interests protected by procedural due process extend well
beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.”); see also Jeffrey S. Lubbers,
Giving Applicants for Veterans’ and Other Government Benefits Their Due (Process), 35
ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 16 (Spring 2010) (noting the interpretation of “property” was
historically limited to tangible items such as money and real estate).
2. This note is limited to discussing procedural due process in the administrative law
context. Substantive due process, a topic well beyond the scope of this note, generally focuses
on the fairness of a result, in contrast to procedural due process which focuses on the fairness
of procedures. See Michael Serota & Michelle Singer, Veterans’ Benefits and Due Process,
90 NEB. L. REV. 388, 405-06 (2011).
3. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (holding that Guantánamo Bay
detainees are afforded certain procedural due process rights); see also Victoria L. Collier &
Drew Early, Cracks in the Armor: Due Process, Attorney’s Fees, and the Department of
Veterans Affairs, 18 ELDER L.J. 1 (2010) (noting that enemy combatants have a right to an
attorney, but veterans do not).
4. Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U.S. 165, 176 (1893) (bestowing Fifth
Amendment Due Process protections upon the plaintiff corporation).
5. Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that
public schools must observe procedural due process when seeking to expel a student).
6. Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding “that applicants for
benefits, no less than current benefits recipients, may possess a property interest in the receipt
of public welfare entitlements”).
7. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
8. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972) (requiring State of Illinois to provide
prisoner with “opportunity to offer proof”).
9. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991) (striking down a Connecticut statute
permitting a prejudgment deprivation without a hearing).
10. Compare Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985)
(holding that a state employee is entitled to a pre-termination hearing where state law
provided that civil servants could only be terminated with cause), with Bd. of Regents of State
Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-79 (1972) (holding that a state employee working under a
one-year contract had no property interest in continued employment and therefore nothing to
trigger due process protections).
11. Captain Arthur G. Haessig, The Soldier’s Right to Administrative Due Process: The
Right to Be Heard, 63 MIL. L. REV. 1, 43 (1974).
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judicial intervention haunting most government agencies. This apparent
anomaly is, in large part, a result of the military deference doctrine.12
The doctrine is an otherwise necessary and legitimate exception to the
general principles of administrative law. But the legitimacy of the
military deference doctrine is not absolute.
Rather, justifiable
application of the doctrine is limited to a narrow construct. This Note
argues that when the military ceases functioning as our nation’s sword
and shield, the military deference doctrine should not apply. This
argument is premised on the proposition that carte blanche application
of the military deference doctrine operates to the exclusion of procedural
due process guarantees for military service members facing disability
benefit adjudications.
This Note argues that the military deference doctrine has no place
in military disability benefit determinations. These determinations do
not implicate the military’s traditional national security functions.
Rather, these adjudications are analogous to functions performed by the
Department of the Veterans Affairs, the Social Security Administration,
and other social welfare programs outside the national defense
apparatus.
From a statistical perspective, military disability adjudications are a
relatively common occurrence. Between 2001 and 2009, approximately
170,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines were processed through
the military’s disability evaluation system.13 Of these 170,000 service
members,14 approximately 139,000 were determined to be medically
unfit for further military duty and involuntarily discharged prior to the
expiration of their military service obligation.15 These service members,
subject to the rigors and potentially life-altering determinations of the
military’s disability evaluation process, have perpetually lacked “judicial
recognition” of basic due process protections.16 The military deference
doctrine commands the judiciary to exercise significant, if not outright,
12. See infra Part I. See generally John F. O’Connor, The Origins and Application of
the Military Deference Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REV. 161, 161-63 (2000). “[I]t is the primary
business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise. The
responsibility for determining how best our Armed Forces shall attend to that business rests
with Congress and with the President.” Id. at 240 (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498, 510 (1975)).
13. ACCESSION MED. STANDARDS ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH ACTIVITY, WALTER
REED INST. OF RESEARCH, TRI-SERVICE DISABILITY EVALUATION SYSTEMS DATABASE
REVIEW, ANNUAL REPORT 2010 13 tbl.3 (Janice K. Gary ed., 2010).
14. The term “service members,” as used herein, refers to Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,
Marines, and all other members of the United States Armed Forces.
15. WALTER REED INST. OF RESEARCH, supra note 13, at 39 tbl.14A.
16. Haessig, supra note 11, at 43.
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deference to the findings and conclusions of military administrators.
Without any threat of meaningful judicial review, military disability
adjudications are plagued by unfairness. Michael Parker, a noted
advocate for service members, has observed “there are only two things
[the military] will do when it come[s] to [the disability evaluation
system]: [w]hat they want to do and what Congress makes them do.”17
This Note argues that a logical and long-overdue first step in curing the
unfairness of the military disability evaluation system is classifying
Department of Defense (DOD) disability benefits as property interests
under the Due Process Clause. The due process argument is premised
on the contention that the military deference doctrine does not apply to
military benefits determinations.
In order to justify this initial step, this Note turns its attention to the
recent opinion of Cushman v. Shinseki.18 Cushman stands for the
proposition that veterans’ benefits administered by the Department of
Veterans Affairs are property interests under the Due Process Clause.19
This 2009 decision was the first time veterans’ benefits were recognized
as property interests, allocating disabled veterans a cause of action under
the United States Constitution.20 This Note argues by analogy that
Cushman justifies classification of military disability benefits as
property interests.
This Note is organized by concept: Parts I-III provide background
material, while Part IV presents the argument of this Note. Part I
provides an overview of procedural due process jurisprudence, the
military deference doctrine, and the inherent conflict between the two.
Part II discusses Cushman v. Shinseki, its progeny, and its implications.
Part III discusses the military’s disability benefits system. Part IV
presents the argument of this Note. First, Cushman justifies classifying
military disability benefits as property interests. Second, military
disability determinations do not implicate the military deference
doctrine. Third, counter-arguments to the propriety of classifying
military disability benefits as property interests are discussed. Finally,
the policy implications of procedural due process in military disability
17. Michael Parker, DoD Finds Yet Another Way to Deny Benefits for PTSD, PHYSICAL
EVALUATION BOARD FORUM, http://www.pebforum.com/site/threads/des-outrage-of-theweek-1-dod-finds-yet-another-way-to-deny-benefits-for-ptsd.6172/ (last visited May 13,
2013).
18. Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Cushman has been referred
to as a “bellwether case,” Collier & Early, supra note 3, at 20, indicative of a new
“constitutional journey” in the evolution of veterans’ law and due process. Id. at 22.
19. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1298.
20. Id. at 1298; Collier, supra note 3, at 20-21.
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determinations are examined.
I.

THE STARTING POINT: DUE PROCESS & THE MILITARY DEFERENCE
DOCTRINE

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in
relevant part, “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”21 Attempts to encapsulate the
precise contours of “due process of law” embody some of the more
colorful commentary among American jurists.22 Some have rejected
“due process of law” as a mere “myth”23 or relic of the Magna Carta.24
Despite the cloud of ideological uncertainty that has descended upon the
Due Process Clause, its practical function as a constitutional bulwark
against arbitrary government adjudication remains relatively
undisputed.25
Indeed, the courts have unequivocally interpreted the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause as guaranteeing a fundamentally fair
adjudication: “[w]hatever disagreement there may be as to the scope of
the phrase ‘due process of law’ there can be no doubt that it embraces
the fundamental conception of a fair trial, with opportunity to be
heard.”26
But where does the guarantee to a “fair trial” and an
“opportunity to be heard” arise?
Are all persons, under all

21. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This Note addresses deprivations effectuated by the federal
government, not any state government. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause is omitted.
22. Writing for the plurality in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), Justice (later
Chief Justice) Rehnquist observed “where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably
intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining
that right, a [Due Process claimant] must take the bitter with the sweet.” Id. at 153-54.
Justice Cardozo has opined that “[i]n whatsoever proceeding . . . the [Due Process Clause]
commands the observance of that standard of common fairness, the failure to observe which
would offend men’s sense of the decencies and proprieties of civilized life.” Snyder v. Mass.,
291 U.S. 97, 127 (1934), abrogated by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
23. Jane Retherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1992) (“Due
process, like Robin Hood, is a myth. It is a set of stories, texts, and values which have been
handed down over 700 years to regulate the relationships between people and government.”).
Id. at 4.
24. Id. at 8. Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta, the forerunner to the Due Process Clause,
provided “[n]o freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or banished or
in any way destroyed, nor will we pass upon, nor will we send upon him, unless by the lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.” MAGNA CARTA ch. 39 (1215).
25. See supra notes 1, 3-10.
26. Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of
due process.”); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)
(requiring a “full opportunity to appear and be heard”).
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circumstances, assured that they will not be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without an “opportunity to be heard?” The Supreme Court of
the United States has explicitly rejected the notion that due process
guarantees extend to all conceivable deprivations.27 To the extent these
prudential limitations have refined the scope of the Due Process Clause,
the Court has effectively outlined the elements necessary to establish a
cognizable due process claim.28
Where an individual is deprived, by government action, of life,
liberty, or property, the Due Process Clause may give rise to a
constitutional challenge. This framework leaves us with several
questions: (1) what is a “deprivation?”; (2) what is “government
action?”; and (3) what is “life, liberty, and property?” For purposes of
this Note, the discussion is limited to what constitutes “property” and the
level of process “due” when one is deprived of “property.”29
A. What is a Property Interest?
Turning to the first question, “property” is loosely conceptualized
as a “bundle of sticks . . . a collection of individual rights which, in
certain combinations, constitute property.”30 Characterizing a thing as a
property interest31 is the first step in the due process inquiry. After all,
in order to be deprived of property, “one must presumably possess it
27. Justice Holmes, writing for the Supreme Court nearly a century ago, explained that
broad-ranging government actions do not afford each and every affected individual an
opportunity to be heard: “[t]here must be a limit to individual argument . . . if government is
to go on.” Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
Legislatures regularly enact laws of every genus that deprive someone, somewhere, of
something. Permitting all affected individuals an opportunity to be heard following, for
example, the enactment of a law increasing taxes for all persons with an income greater than
one dollar, is simply inefficient. See id.
28. Compare id. at 446 with Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373
(1908). Londoner concerned “[a] relatively small number of persons . . . who were
exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds, and it was held that they had a
right to a hearing.” Bi-Metallic Inv. Co., 239 U.S. at 446. “But [Londoner] is far from
reaching a general determination dealing only with the principle upon which all the
assessments in a county had been laid [in Bi-Metallic].” Id. Thus, the “opportunity to be
heard” arises from government adjudication, insofar as specific facts are decided with respect
to a particular group of individuals. See Londoner, 210 U.S. at 386.
29. The Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs are cabinet-level
agencies of the United States Government. Where either agency “deprives” someone of a due
process interest, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is implicated—there is no statelevel deprivation which would otherwise trigger the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.
30. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (emphasis added).
31. The term “property interest” is used interchangeably with the term “property” in
this Note.
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first.”32
After a bevy of due process challenges in the 1970s, the Supreme
Court began recognizing property interests in “legal entitlements” to a
thing, in contrast to a mere expectation or actual possession thereof.33
Determining whether one is “legally entitled” to a thing generally
depends on whether there is a source of law containing explicit criteria
for entitlement to that thing.34 To illustrate, the welfare benefits at issue
in Goldberg v. Kelly were payable to individuals meeting a certain
statutory criteria.35 The moment the Goldberg plaintiff was determined
to have satisfied the statutory criteria, a “legal entitlement” to welfare
benefits was acquired.36 It is important to emphasize that the individual
satisfying the statutory criteria enjoyed “legal entitlement” to welfare
benefits before actually receiving the benefit.37 However, the Court’s
broad reading of “legal entitlements” as a property interest is qualified
by Goldberg’s progeny.
In cases following Goldberg, the Supreme Court stopped short of
extending the “entitlement” premise to a logical extreme: “a protected
[due process] interest [is created] by placing substantive limitations on
official discretion.”38 Accordingly, to the extent a source of law
provides that, if certain criteria are satisfied, then “specific directives to
the decision-maker . . . [mandate that] a particular outcome must
follow,” a due process interest is created.39 Consequently, if a statute
32. Lubbers, supra note 1, at 16.
33. Id. at 17 (quoting Professor Michael Herz). See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972) (“[P]roperty interests protected by procedural due process
extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.”); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 277 (1970) (“It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more
like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’ Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of
rights that do not fall within traditional common-law concepts of property . . . [modern
society] is built around entitlement.”).
34. “[E]ntitlements are . . . ‘not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and
that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.’” Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v.
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972)).
35. See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 277.
36. “[T]he welfare recipients in [Goldberg] had a claim of entitlement to welfare
payments . . . grounded in the statute defining eligibility . . . . The recipients had not yet
shown that they were . . . within the statutory terms of eligibility. [Nonetheless,] they had a
right to a hearing at which they might attempt to do so.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
37. See supra note 35.
38. Ky. Dep’t. of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462 (1989) (quoting Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983)).
39. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 463.

CARNELLI FINAL 51313.DOC

168

5/15/13 2:43 PM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:161

requires all persons over the age of twenty to be paid fifty dollars from
the state treasury, all persons acquire a property interest in those fifty
dollars (i.e. entitlement) when they turn twenty. In contrast, “a benefit is
not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it
in their discretion.”40 Thus, if an individual’s legal entitlement to a thing
is at the complete mercy of government discretion, a protected property
interest does not exist.41 For example, a statute providing for a tax credit
when, in the sole opinion of the governor, a residential homeowner has
maintained the “prettiest” lawn in their municipality, does not bestow a
cognizable property interest.
There are, of course, sources of law creating entitlements that do
not neatly fit in to either end of the spectrum.42 These sources are
analyzed under a sliding scale where the court examines the level of
particularity under which officials must exercise their discretion.43 In
any case, establishing the existence of a property interest is, relatively
speaking, “the easy part.”44 Even where an individual enjoys a property
interest in a thing, one must then resolve the matters of “deprivation”
and the level of process that may be “due.”
B. How Much Process is Due?
The second question brings us back to the fundamental purpose of
the Due Process Clause: ensuring individuals have “the opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”45 before “being
condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind.”46 Consequently, the
“process due” inquiry can arise before an actual “deprivation” of a
property interest occurs.47 Of course, the extent of “process due” is the
40. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005).
41. “To have a property interest in a benefit,” one must “have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. If entitlement is premised on government discretion
in the relevant source of law, the “legitimacy” of any “claim of entitlement” falls within that
discretion. However, statutes containing particular discretionary guidelines and mandatory
action under those guidelines may create a due process interest. See Thompson, 490 U.S. at
463-64 (1989).
42. See supra note 40.
43. See supra note 40.
44. Interview with Bruce K. Miller, Professor of Law, Western New England
University School of Law, in Springfield, Mass. (Fall 2011).
45. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)) (internal quotations omitted).
46. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (internal quotations omitted).
47. “This Court consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an
individual is finally deprived of a property interest.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (emphasis
added).
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central question in this context—and it is a deceivingly simple one—has
the government followed constitutionally adequate procedures? While
the construct of the due process analysis is rather straightforward, “much
else remains uncertain.”48
This uncertainty primarily arises from the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Mathews v. Eldridge.49 In Mathews, the court introduced a threepronged test for determining the level of “process due.”50 At the
threshold, the Court stated that the proper extent of process due is an ad
hoc determination: “[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”51 Hence,
resolution of the issue requires balancing (1) “the private interest that
will be affected by the official action;”52 (2) “the risk of . . . erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value . . . of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;”53
and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved . . .
the fiscal and administrative burdens that . . . additional or substitute
[procedures] would entail.”54 It is the outwardly ad hoc nature of
Mathews balancing, coupled with the inherent subjectivity of the factors
considered, that create an aura of uncertainty with respect to the “how
much process is due” inquiry.55 However, the Mathews opinion and
extant progeny have carved out some general principles which purport to
quell some of this uncertainty.56
First, the gravity of the “private interest that will be affected by the
official action” is the major premise upon which the other two factors
are considered.57 The Mathews opinion framed this concept as the “the
degree of potential deprivation.”58 Goldberg is illustrative: the Court

48. Erwin Chemerinsky, Procedural Due Process Claims, 16 TOURO L. REV. 871, 893
(1999).
49. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 319 (1976).
50. Id. at 334-35.
51. Id. at 334.
52. Id. at 335.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. “When there is a three-part balancing test like [Mathews], courts have enormous
discretion and in all likelihood different factors will point in varying directions.”
Chemerinsky, supra note 48, at 889.
56. Most importantly, the Supreme Court has held that while the federal and state
governments effectively create property interests, the level of process due is a purely
constitutional issue decided as a matter of law. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
57. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321.
58. Id. at 341.
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found the “private interest” in welfare benefits as paramount,
emphasizing how the disabilities following termination of the benefits
effectively precluded the claimant from seeking meaningful redress.59
Thus, as a general matter, “[t]he more important the interest to the
individual, the more procedural protections the court is going to
require.”60
The second and third prongs of Mathews balancing are discussed in
tandem due to their varying case-specific applications. The second
prong, the “risk of erroneous deprivation” through current procedures
and the probability that other procedures will lead to more accurate
results is, both numerically and conceptually, “[c]entral to the evaluation
of any administrative process.”61 The third prong involves considering
the “[g]overnment’s interest” to be free from unreasonable
administrative burdens.62 Here, the question is in the nature of a costbenefit analysis.63
Mathews balancing is the current standard employed to determine
the level of process that ought to be afforded before a person may be
deprived of a property interest. However, Mathews balancing has
proved to be a difficult standard for many courts to apply.64
C. Due Process & the Military Deference Doctrine
The functional application of the Due Process Clause has
perpetually shifted with the ebb and flow of our society. Unsurprisingly,
changes in our society have collided, on many occasions, with the
cornerstones of our Constitution. Nowhere has a collision been more
announced, in the procedural due process context, than in the conflict
between due process and administrative law, where the judiciary is
brought to bear on the expertise of specialized government agencies.65
The principal question underlying this debate is: how can the courts tell
an agency, concededly experts in their vested functions, what procedures

59. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (emphasis omitted).
60. Chemerinsky, supra note 48, at 888-89.
61. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343. See Chemerinsky, supra note 48, at 889.
62. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348-49.
63. “At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by
the administrative action and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just,
may be outweighed by the cost.” Id. at 348.
64. See infra Part IV.
65. See generally Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-96 (2012)
(Congress enacted the APA in 1946 in response to the vast expansion of federal power
following “New Deal” legislation. Specifically, the APA sought to address the growing
number and powers of federal agencies).
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they must utilize? After all, judges and lawyers are not learned in the
idiosyncrasies of operating social welfare programs, providing public
education, or engaging in military operations—to name a few examples.
Both the legislature and judiciary have purported to resolve this
systemic gap.66 Much like the ad hoc due process analysis in Mathews,
courts engage in varying levels of deference when reviewing agency
decisions or procedures—contingent on the agency function or
determination at issue.67 Congress has outlined several specific
standards of review in the Administrative Procedure Act; while case law,
policy, and history have also served as sources to balance the judiciary’s
prerogative “to say what the law is”68 with an agency’s expertise in any
particular area.69
However, constitutional issues arising in administrative
controversies introduce a unique circumstance where the court, not the
agency, is the expert.70 This general principle has been reflected in
numerous judicial decisions involving challenges to agency actions.71
But one particular “agency,” the Armed Forces of the United States,72
has enjoyed an exceptional level of deference even where constitutional
questions are implicated. This inertia arises from the force of the
military deference doctrine, which obstructs any meaningful application
of the procedural due process apparatus by a court engaging in judicial
review of a military action or determination.73
66. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706; Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
67. Cf. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915);
Londoner v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (providing a fundamental
distinction between legislative facts and adjudicative facts).
68. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
69. 5 U.S.C. § 706. Prudential examples are found throughout relevant literature, for
instance: “[c]ourts . . . recognize an exception when exhaustion [of administrative remedies]
would be futile because the agency apparently will not grant relief. The appearance of futility
may come from evidence of bad faith on part of the agency [or] past patterns of an agency's
decision making.” Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from
Environmental Cases, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 40 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
70. “[C]onstitutional questions . . . present the strongest argument that the agency lacks
credentials or authority to decide an issue.” Id. at 44.
71. See supra notes 1, 3-10.
72. This is the official designation for describing all military forces of the United States.
See U.S. NAVY STYLE GUIDE, http://www.navy.mil/submit/view_styleguide.asp?sort=A (last
visited May 13, 2013).
73. “At the risk of oversimplification, the military deference doctrine requires that a
court considering certain constitutional challenges to military legislation perform a more
lenient constitutional review than would be appropriate if the challenged legislation were in
the civilian context.” O’Connor, supra note 12, at 161.
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1. The Military Deference Doctrine Explained
The guarantees of due process, and arguably the law as a whole,
have been perpetually tempered by the threat or existence of armed
conflict. “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience .
. . . The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly
correspond[s] . . . with what is then understood to be convenient.”74
What is “convenient,” in this context, seems to be inextricably connected
with the nation’s “[s]afety from external danger.”75 Alexander Hamilton
observed:
The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the
continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger,
will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose
and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their
civil and political rights. To be [safer], they at length become
76
willing to run the risk of being less free.

There has been considerable scholarly debate surrounding the
“crisis thesis,” which constitutes the conceptual foundation of the
military deference doctrine.77 Overall, the doctrine’s premise is simple:
during times of war, national security is the paramount concern of all
branches of government.78 The doctrine requires the government to
presume that national security rests on the swift and efficient
administration of the military.
Consequently, as a branch of
government, the judiciary has acquiesced to this command by
manifesting reluctance, if not clear refusal, to interfere in military
affairs—especially during times of conflict.79
74. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1-2 (1881).
75. THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton).
76. Id.
77. “[T]he thesis is not so much about [the Supreme Court’s] treatment of alleged
infringements of rights and liberties made by all types of parties but rather about deference
strictly in cases when the U.S. government is a party.” Lee Epstein et al., THE SUPREME
SILENCE DURING WAR 14 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with New York
University), available at http://www.nyu.edu/classes/nbeck/q2/king.propensity.pdf.
78. “[T]he power to wage war is the power to wage war successfully . . . [resulting in]
deference to the government . . . in areas of military judgment, such as the establishment of
military tribunals, [and] also [in] broad forms of general regulation that are seen to be
relevant, however peripherally, to the war effort.” Id. at 16.
79. The Supreme Court has explained the exceptional level of judicial deference it
affords the military: “[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which
the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional
military judgments.” Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981) (alteration in original)
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However, the doctrine’s significant level of deference does not lack
absolute justification.80 Affording the military the ability to wage war,
effectively unimpeded by judicial scrutiny, allows the necessary
flexibility to conduct military operations successfully. Prior to World
War II, notions of military deterrence and force projection were of
relatively little concern to the United States.81 Incidents of armed
conflict were isolated and otherwise unique to our national experience.
But after the surrender of the Axis Powers in 1945, the new balance of
power necessitated the United States to maintain a “standing army” for
the first time in the country’s relatively short existence.82
Proliferation of the military establishment was well received, as the
country faced a perceived, if not actual threat, of “[f]requent war and
constant apprehension, [that required] a state of constant preparation.”83
The threat of war with the Soviet Union resulted in the existence of a
vast military establishment.84
The military deference doctrine,
historically limited to application as an exception in times of war and
national emergency, now took on the form of a “convenient” general
rule.85 The doctrine’s functional shift was justified on the simple
premise that the nation was now in a perpetual state of war— judicial
(quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)). See Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83,
93-94 (1953) (“But judges are not given the task of running the Army . . . [t]he Military
constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the
civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with
legitimate Army matters.”).
80. See generally O’Connor, supra note 12, at 161. “[T]he military deference doctrine
remains a viable, omnipresent part of the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence,
despite the best efforts of litigants and legal commentators to convince the country otherwise.”
Id. at 163.
81. See Neutrality Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-76, 49 Stat. 1081 (amended 1937, 1939),
repealed by Lend-Lease Act, Pub. L. No. 77-11, 55 Stat. 3034 (1941).
82. Hamilton warned of standing armies: “The continual necessity for their services
enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably [sic] degrades the condition of the
citizen.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton).
83. Id.
84. See generally MICHAEL S. SHERRY, IN THE SHADOW OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES
SINCE THE 1930S, 176-77 (Yale University, 1995).
85. At the conclusion of World War II the United States turned to a policy of military
deterrence, principled on maintaining a military force to an extent that “no potential aggressor
may be tempted to risk his own destruction.” President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell
Address (Jan. 17, 1961). In a sense, the country was now in a perpetual state of war. An
obvious example of “war-time deference” is found with habeas corpus. Habeas corpus was
wholly suspended during the Civil War, Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, Pub. L. No. 37-81,
12 Stat. 755 (1863), partially suspended in World War II, Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942),
and effectively suspended shortly after the 9/11/01 attacks, Military Order—Detention,
Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg.
57833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
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interference could compromise national security.
2.

The Point of Impact—The Due Process Clause and Military
Deference

The Due Process Clause analytical framework contemplates three
fundamental questions.86 Of those three questions, asking “how much
process is due” in military cases precipitates an immediate conflict with
the military deference doctrine. Application of the doctrine in the
procedural due process context is easily vindicated by the principle
announced in Mathews: “[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”87 The
military deference doctrine manifested itself in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a
recent due process case.88 In Hamdi, the Court engaged in Mathews
balancing to determine whether the petitioner, an American citizen
detained by United States military personnel during combat operations
in Afghanistan, was essentially deprived of “liberty . . . without due
process of law.”89
Under the first Mathews prong, the Court stated “Hamdi’s ‘private
interest . . . affected by the official action,’ is the most elemental of
liberty interests—the interest in being free from physical detention by
one’s own government.”90 Despite the exceptional characterization of
the due process interest, the Court meshed the military deference
doctrine with the second Mathews prong: “the exigencies of the
circumstances may demand that . . . enemy-combatant proceedings may
be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive
at a time of ongoing military conflict.”91 On this premise, the Court
utilized the second Mathews prong to limit the extent of process due in
enemy-combatant determinations by the military.92 Specifically, the
Court effectively waived the ban on hearsay evidence in such
proceedings, as well as creating “a [rebuttable] presumption in favor of
the Government’s evidence.”93 Not only was the military deference

86. See supra text accompanying note 29.
87. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
88. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (Souter, J. and Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part; Scalia, J., Stevens, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (plurality
opinion).
89. Id. at 529 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
90. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
91. Id. at 533.
92. Id. at 554.
93. Id. at 534.
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doctrine utilized as a premise to limit procedural due process, but also to
expand the scope of military deference itself.
It can hardly be said that judicial invocation of the military
deference doctrine, even in the Hamdi case, was a new or surprising
development.94 Extension of procedural due process protections to
numerous classes of individuals in the 1970s95 did not meaningfully
affect the military’s administration of anything, even in the face of legal
challenges made by service members during peacetime.96 To the extent
Cicero warned inter arma silent leges (during war law is silent),97 it is
ironic that the law seems to have been “silent” only for those fighting in
war.
D. Moving Forward
The military deference doctrine is a self-fulfilling prophecy insofar
as the courts neither engage in any substantive analysis of the doctrine
nor can the courts meaningfully review any claim tangentially classified
as “military.”98 It is probably unwise to sit idly by and wait for the
second coming of Pax Americana, where peace and the absence of
conflict will allow us to revisit this doctrine.99 Analytically speaking,
94. “[T]hose law review writers who opine that the military deference doctrine has
somehow eroded . . . are engaging in wishful thinking more than anything. The Supreme
Court’s military deference jurisprudence has remained essentially static since [the 1970s].”
O’Connor, supra note 12, at 308.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 1-12.
96. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) (“[J]udicial deference . . . is at its
apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies
and make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged.”).
97. Epstein, et al., supra note 77, at 3.
98. The doctrine finds its roots in history. One would be hard pressed to discover its
origin in the United States Constitution, statutes, or common law. Instead, the military
deference doctrine is a historical principle underpinning the very fabric of all human affairs,
arguably since time immemorial. If one were to accept Thomas Hobbes’s idea of the social
contract, it follows that when two or more humans made peace, the legal “consideration” was
that both parties could escape their state of nature and perpetual war. The benefits of the
social contract are evident from the basic societal apparatus—laws, government, and
civilization itself—that we enjoy today. The “transaction cost” of this contract stems from the
fundamental reason humans entered it in the first place—to avoid the state of nature (e.g.
war). Just as the law, physical science, and morality have developed as a contractual
“benefit,” the manner in which we ensure the social contract’s performance—beginning with
simple bands of warriors to modern military forces—has always been a function which takes
priority over all else. Every instance where the benefits of the social contract have been
sacrificed to ensure “contractual performance” over all of human history is where one can
“find” the military deference doctrine. The doctrine stems from the “transaction cost” we
must pay to ensure performance of the social contract.
99. Pax Americana (American Peace) was a term used by President John F. Kennedy in
his commencement address to American University’s class of 1963:
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military due process claimants must negotiate the obstacle created by the
doctrine in order to receive any favorable finding under Mathews
balancing. Without doing so, judicial review will likely be futile. To
accomplish this task, this Note argues that where the military is not
wearing its “military hat,” the doctrine ought not to apply.100 It is one
thing to protect military decision-makers from making good-faith efforts
to ensure personnel readiness. But, turning to the immediate concern of
this Note, disability benefits administered by the military do not
implicate personnel readiness issues—and certainly do not implicate
national security concerns.
In fact, military disability benefits share much in common with
benefits administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA).101
Cushman v. Shinseki, discussed in the following part, provides an
important starting point for the eventual analogy argued for by this
Note.102 As discussed infra, Part I.A, the threshold question under the
Due Process Clause is whether or not one holds a property interest in a
thing. Cushman stands for the proposition that DVA disability benefits
are protected property interests.103 The military deference doctrine does
not apply to determinations made by the DVA, but was introduced at
this point to conceptually illustrate its connection to procedural due
process. This Note will now turn to a discussion of Cushman in detail,
returning to discussion of the military deference doctrine in connection
with DOD adjudications.

What kind of peace do I mean? What kind of a peace do we seek? Not a Pax
Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of
the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace, the kind of
peace that makes life on earth worth living, the kind that enables men and nations to
grow and to hope and to build a better life for their children—not merely peace for
Americans but peace for all men and women, not merely peace in our time but
peace in all time.
President John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address at Am. Univ. (June 10, 1963) (transcript
available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BWC7I4C9QUmLG9J6I8oy8w.aspx).
100. See infra Part IV.
101. See infra Part III.
102. Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
103. Id.
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II. ONE GIANT LEAP: CUSHMAN V. SHINSEKI
A. The Story of Philip Cushman
Rules of Engagement104 contains a memorable scene where Tommy
Lee Jones, playing the part of Marine Corps Colonel Hayes Hodges,
coldly stares at the President’s National Security Advisor and inquires:
“You ever had a pissed-off Marine on your ass?” Insulted, the National
Security Advisor asks: “Is that a threat?” Colonel Hodges poignantly
replies: “Oh, yes sir.”105 Cushman v. Shinseki is about a “pissed-off
Marine” named Philip Cushman. Like Colonel Hodges’s client in Rules
of Engagement, Mr. Cushman was the victim of fraud perpetrated by
government officials.106
Once this fraud was discovered, Mr.
Cushman—also a Marine—sought to remedy the injustice with a
persistence rarely observed in the civilian world. His determination paid
off, creating a well-overdue precedent for military veterans and
vindicating the oft-quoted maxim that there is “no better friend, no
worse enemy” than a United States Marine.107
Cushman’s story began during the Vietnam War. While serving in
Vietnam with the United States Marine Corps, he suffered a back
injury.108 In 1974, four years after his discharge, Cushman was still
suffering from the effects of his back injury.109 That same year, he filed
an application for disability compensation with the DVA, citing his back
injury as the basis for his claim.110 After several bouts of Compensation
104. The film was released in 2000. Unbeknownst to the screenwriters at the time of
the film’s production, the subject matter of their story was a grim foreshadowing of problems
to come.
105. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (Paramount Pictures 2000).
106. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1295.
107. Did He Go Too Far?, TIME (Feb. 28, 2005),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1032357-1,00.html. See Cushman, 576
F.3d at 1294.
108. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1295. The court noted that Cushman served in a “combat
infantry battalion,” id., a superfluous description considering the primary purpose of an
infantry battalion is combat: “[t]he primary . . . mission of the Infantry battalion . . . is to close
with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver. To destroy or capture him, to repel his
assaults by fire, close combat, or counterattack.” Id. See UNITED STATES ARMY FIELD
MANUAL FM 3-21.20, THE INFANTRY BATTALION, § 1-1 (2006).
109. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1292.
110. Id. Veterans who served during war or a national emergency may file a claim for
disability compensation with the DVA under 38 U.S.C. § 1110. The disability compensation
claim prevails if there is preponderance of a “nexus” between (1) the veteran’s current
disability and (2) their military service. See id. Justice Antonin Scalia has indicated it may be
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and Pension examinations,111 the DVA classified his back condition as
“service connected”112 and awarded Cushman a 60% disability rating.113
However, his victory was short-lived.
Cushman had secured civilian employment as manager of a
flooring store, a job which required some manual labor.114 By 1976, his
back condition deteriorated to a point where he had to “lie flat on his
back” in the rear of the store and “fill out paperwork.”115 That same
year, Cushman was asked to resign his job, at which point he sought reassessment of his back condition at a local DVA clinic.116
On the date of the re-assessment, the examining DVA clinician
wrote what would become the last comment in Cushman’s medical
record: that Cushman’s back condition “[i]s worse + must stop present
type of work.”117 Under the Veterans Affairs Schedule for Rating
Disabilities (VASRD), Cushman carried the maximum schedular rating
for his particular back condition.118 Stated differently, despite his
deteriorating prognosis, he could not request a higher rating under the
VASRD. However, because his back condition prevented him from
gainful employment, Cushman was eligible for Total Disability based on
Individual Unemployability (TDIU) benefits.119 TDIU compensation
would allow Cushman to collect disability compensation beyond the
schedular limit of 60% for his back condition.120
wise to avoid using “nexus” in any petitions for certiorari: “[a]nother one of my bêtes noires
of legalisms is nexus. Yeah, nexus. What is it? It’s Latin for ‘connection.’ You don’t make
it more scientific at all by calling it a nexus.” THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF LEGAL WRITERS,
THE SCRIBES JOURNAL OF LEGAL WRITING 58 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 2010).
111. Informally referred to as “C and P exams” in the veterans’ community, these
evaluations determine the scope and degree of the veteran’s purported disability. The DVA
publishes examination worksheets outlining procedures for evaluating different medical
conditions.
112. Classification of a veteran’s condition as “service connected” indicates a
connection between their current disability and military service. In some cases, the
classification gives rise to a rebuttable presumption in favor of the veteran. 38 C.F.R. § 3.102
(2011).
113. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1292. Both the DVA and DOD utilize the Veterans Affairs
Schedule for Rating Disabilities to determine appropriate disability awards for service
members and veterans. The schedule is found in 38 C.F.R. ch. 1, pt. 4 (2011).
114. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1292.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1292-93.
118. Id. at 1292.
119. Id. at 1293. TDIU is generally available to veterans “unable to secure or follow a
substantially gainful occupation as a result of service-connected disabilities.” 38 C.F.R. §
4.16 (2011).
120. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.16. TDIU awards operate as equivalent to a 100% disability
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From 1977, the year the TDIU claim was initially filed, until 1994
when the DVA finally acquiesced, Cushman went without TDIU
compensation.121 His TDIU claim and subsequent appeals were denied
in 1978, 1980, and 1982.122 In 1997, twenty years later and likely to
Cushman’s complete astonishment, he discovered a substantial alteration
to his 1976 assessment.123 Cushman immediately sought relief from the
DVA, but again was denied.124 Cushman appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, essentially arguing that he was denied a
“fundamentally fair adjudication of his claim” in violation of the Due
Process Clause.125
B. An Opportunity To Be Heard (Finally)
Mr. Cushman presented a Fifth Amendment claim, arguing that he
was deprived of his interest in DVA disability benefits without due
process of law.126 In considering whether veterans’ benefits are
classifiable as property interests, the Cushman court began its analysis
by observing that such benefits are not “granted on the basis of need,”
but instead are mandated by statute.127 Analogizing DVA benefits with
Social Security benefits, the court noted that DVA benefits are mandated
by statutes “independent [of] . . . DVA proceedings.”128 To the extent
that statutory provisions set forth the eligibility criteria for veterans’
benefits, “an absolute right of benefits to qualified individuals” exists.129
On this reasoning, the court determined that DVA benefits are a
protected property interest and, therefore, applicants demonstrating
rating. Id.
121. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1293.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1294. Cushman’s original medical record had been changed from “[i]s
worse + must stop present type of work” to “[i]s worse + must stop present type of work, or at
least [ ] bend [ ] stoop lift.” Id. (emphasis in original) (brackets indicate illegible stray
marks).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1296.
126. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. As discussed supra Part I.A, the Fifth Amendment
applies because Cushman argues that his veterans’ benefits constitute a property interest and
the DVA, a federal agency, has deprived him of such benefits without a fair hearing. See
Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1290. As discussed supra Part I.A, a colorable due process claim
requires establishing the existence of a property interest: to briefly review, a benefit is a
property interest if an individual has (1) “a legitimate claim of entitlement to [the benefit],”
and (2) government officials cannot “grant or deny [the benefit] in their discretion. Id. at
1297.
127. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1297
128. Id.
129. Id.
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eligibility for DVA benefits cannot be deprived without due process.130
Turning to the instant case, the court explained that under § 1110 of Title
38, Cushman acquired a “legitimate claim of entitlement” for DVA
benefits when he was injured in Vietnam.131 Only where a veteran fails
to establish a connection between his purported disability and military
service does the DVA have the absolute authority to deny a claim.132
Now that DVA disability benefits were characterized as protected
property interests, satisfying the threshold procedural due process
inquiry, the court proceeded to consider the question of “how much
process is due?”133 On behalf of Secretary Shinseki,134 the government
argued that the DVA did not violate the mandates of procedural due
process.135 Specifically, the government argued: (1) due process is
satisfied when a claim has been appealed and reviewed multiple times,
and (2) because DVA procedures provide sufficient due process to
veterans’ claims as a general matter, an issue in one case does not
demonstrate a lack of fairness to DVA procedures as whole.136 The
court quickly rejected the government’s first argument, stating that the
sheer number of appeals is irrelevant in determining the extent of
process due.137 Instead, the proper question is whether any of
Cushman’s appeals, with the presence of the falsified record, ever
permitted a fair consideration of his claim.138 The court also rejected the
government’s second argument, noting that Cushman was not
challenging the fairness of the DVA procedural framework as whole.139
Cushman’s argument, foreshadowing the ultimate decision of the
court, was well received.140 Cushman argued that the DVA “failed to
fairly apply existing procedures [to] his case.”141 Holding in favor of
Cushman, the court stated “[a]lterations of evidence are material for due
130. Id. at 1298.
131. Id.
132. See 38 U.S.C. § 1110. Upon application for benefits, the DVA must make a
finding of fact that the veteran’s disability did not arise from his military service. Cushman,
576 F.3d at 1298-99.
133. Id. at 1298.
134. Eric K. Shinseki, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs at the time of this writing, is a
former four-star General in the United States Army. Secretary Shinseki served as the Army
Chief of Staff from 1999 until 2003, when General George W. Casey, Jr. succeeded him.
135. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1299.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1300.
141. Id. at 1299.
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process purposes if there is a ‘reasonable probability of a different
result’ absent those alterations.”142 It was obvious that Cushman’s TDIU
claim would have been adjudicated quite differently absent the altered
document. The court’s ultimate holding observed that the fairness of
Cushman’s TDIU claims were compromised and ordered a new hearing
without the presence of the altered document.143
C. Distilling Cushman
Cushman v. Shinseki was hailed by some as precipitating “an
exciting time and a time of change,”144 and others as “[opening]
Pandora’s Box.”145
Two cases following Cushman refine its
implications: Gambill v. Shinseki146 and Edwards v. Shinseki.147 In the
aggregate, the Cushman progeny refines two issues: (1) when does a
veteran acquire a property interest in DVA benefits?; and (2) once a
veteran acquires a property interest in DVA benefits, how much process
is due?
1.

When Does a Veteran Acquire a Property Interest in
Benefits?

One of the broader implications of Cushman is that it effectively
stands for the proposition that applicants for veterans’ benefits hold a
property interest in those benefits.148 The Cushman court stated “[a]
veteran is entitled to disability benefits upon a showing that he meets the
eligibility requirements set forth in the governing statutes and
regulations. We conclude that such entitlement to benefits is a property
interest.”149 The court’s conclusion is based on a distillation of Supreme
Court opinions addressing the temporal implications of determining
when an individual acquires a property interest in benefits.150
Generally, the court begins by revisiting the principles announced
in Goldberg and its progeny: that “a legitimate claim of entitlement” and
142. Id. at 1300 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)).
143. Id.
144. Collier & Early, supra note 3, at 22.
145. Emily Woodward Deutsch & Robert James Burriesci, Due Process in the Wake of
Cushman v. Shinseki: The Inconsistency of Extending a Constitutionally-Protected Property
Interest to Applicants for Veterans’ Benefits, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 220, 220 (2011).
146. Gambill v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
147. Edwards v. Shinseki, 582 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
148. Insofar as “applicants” are those “who have not yet been adjudicated as entitled to
[benefits].” Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1296.
149. Id. at 1298 (emphasis added).
150. See id. at 1296-97.
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the discretionary nature of the benefit are central to whether a property
interest exists.151 Veterans’ benefits, the court explains, are neither
granted on the basis of need nor awarded on a discretionary basis.152
Rather, governing statutes153 grant an “an absolute right of benefits to
qualified individuals.”154
The significance of these principles is evident from a practical
comparison. Where the government may grant or deny a benefit on a
discretionary basis, the “entitlement” determination is subjective and
vested in the official. On the other hand, where benefits are absolutely
vested in individuals meeting explicit statutory criteria, the power of
“entitlement” is objective—the applicant either meets the criteria or does
not meet the criteria. Thus, in the case of non-discretionary benefits,
“the current holder of the entitlement and the applicant are identically
situated.”155 This distinction is the basis for Cushman’s proposition that
applicants for benefits hold a property interest therein.
The court’s conclusion on this issue comports with the view that an
individual acquires a property interest in a non-discretionary benefit
upon gaining legal entitlement to the benefit.156 Legal entitlement does
not arise from adjudication, but from the statute conferring the nondiscretionary benefit. Veterans, therefore, acquire a property interest in
veterans’ benefits as an incident to their military service, not the DVA’s
characterization thereof.157
The day after Cushman was decided, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit penned another opinion in Gambill v. Shinseki.158 The
Gambill opinion tacitly concurs with the Cushman proposition that mere
applicants hold a property interest in veterans’ benefits, but states that
harmless error review applies to due process challenges of veteranapplicants.159 Thus, Gambill effectively places a requirement of
151. Id. at 1297.
152. Id.
153. See 38 U.S.C. § 1110.
154. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1297.
155. Lubbers, supra note 1, at 17.
156. See supra Part I.A.
157. See 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (“[T]he United States will pay to any veteran . . . disabled
and . . . discharged . . . under conditions other than dishonorable from the period of service in
which . . . injury or disease was incurred, or preexisting injury or disease was aggravated,
compensation as provided in this subchapter.”).
158. Gambill v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1307, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Gambill was decided
on August 13, 2009. Cushman is dated August 12, 2009.
159. Id. at 1311 (“Harmless error is fully applicable to veterans’ claims cases, subject to
the same principles that apply generally to harmless error analysis in other civil and
administrative cases.”).
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establishing prejudicial error by the DVA in procedural due process
challenges.160 In contrast, a concurring opinion by Judge Rader in
Edwards v. Shinseki explicitly rejected the notion that veteran-applicants
hold a property interest in veterans’ benefits.161 But Judge Rader’s
concurrence is of debatable consequence in considering whether DVA
benefits are protected property interests for applicants or those already in
receipt of benefits.
2.

How Much Process is Due?

The inevitable question that will follow a newly-minted property
interest is the extent and degree of “process” that must be afforded to the
individual prior to any final deprivation of the interest.162 Cushman did
not thoroughly address how much process is required when the DVA
purports to deprive a veteran of his or her entitlement to veterans’
benefits.163 Mathews balancing was not necessary because all of
Cushman’s post-1976 proceedings were plagued by the existence of a
fraudulent record—precluding consideration of specific DVA
procedures.164 The exact boundaries of process due to veterans (and
veteran-applicants) in DVA adjudications remain essentially undefined.
Some commentators predict an extension of additional procedural
requirements into veterans’ benefits cases.165 While others, as discussed
below, argue that the imposition of additional procedural due process
safeguards in the DVA framework is an unnecessary and perhaps
imprudent intervention. In either case, it is beyond doubt that Mathews
balancing will determine the extent of process due in DVA benefits

160. Veterans already in receipt of DVA benefits must also comply with the prejudicial
error requirement. Id.
161. “I perceive that this court has run before the Supreme Court sounded the starting
gun on property rights for applicants. Before demonstrating an entitlement to benefits, a
veteran must first prove an injury or condition sustained as a result of their service. Without
such a showing, no ‘entitlement’ arises.” Edwards v. Shinseki, 582 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (Rader, J., concurring).
162. “[The Supreme Court] consistently has held that some form of hearing is required
before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest.” Edwards, 582 F.3d at 1355
(quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
163. But the Cushman court did provide some guiding principles: “The procedural
framework for adjudicating claims must be sufficient for the large majority of a group of
claims in order to be constitutionally adequate for all . . . [a] fundamentally fair adjudication
within that framework, however, is constitutionally required in all cases, and not just in the
large majority.” Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1299-300 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted).
164. Id. at 1299.
165. “Due process will play a larger role in VA decisions; the exact nature of that role
will only be determined through case law.” Collier & Early, supra note 3, at 22.

CARNELLI FINAL 51313.DOC

184

5/15/13 2:43 PM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:161

adjudications. As of the writing of this Note, Mathews balancing has not
been squarely applied to a DVA disability case. However, Gambill and
Edwards provide some possible examples of what is to come.
Cushman’s novel holding instigated trepidation among the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, concededly due to the inherent
difficulties of applying Mathews balancing. Judge Bryson, in Gambill v.
Shinseki166 and Judge Rader, in Edwards v. Shinseki both manifested
disagreement with Cushman.167 Both disagreed on the premise that “the
difficulties of extending due process to applicants,” especially
considering the issue of how much process applicants are due, were not
thoroughly considered.168 These alleged “difficulties” are a reflection of
the problems incident to applying Mathews balancing to the
exceptionally complex framework manufactured by Congress for
adjudicating veterans’ claims.
First, in Gambill, Judge Bryson presented his primary gripe with
Cushman through the lens of Walters v. National Association of
Radiation Survivors.169 Walters, argued before the Supreme Court,
involved a challenge to a statute limiting attorney’s fees to ten dollars in
Judge Bryson outlined the Supreme Court’s
veterans’ cases.170
application of the Mathews test in Walters, noting that under the first
Mathews prong, veterans’ benefits are not granted on the basis of
need.171 Thus, the value of a veteran’s “private interest” requires less
process than is afforded to welfare recipients and the like.172 With
respect to the second Mathews prong, Judge Bryson observed the
Court’s deference to the statutory safeguards already existing in the
DVA framework.173 Under the third Mathews prong, Judge Bryson
observed that imposing additional procedural requirements would
amount to a dereliction of Congress’s intent to create a paternalistic,
informal, and non-adversarial framework for adjudicating veterans’
benefits.174
In sum, Judge Bryson implies that current DVA procedures,
166. Gambill v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Bryson, J.,
concurring).
167. Edwards, 582 F.3d at 1356 (Rader, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 1357.
169. Gambill, 576 F.3d at 1313-24; see Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors,
473 U.S. 305 (1985).
170. Walters, 473 U.S. at 308.
171. Gambill, 576 F.3d at 1314.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1314-15.
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considered in light of “the informal and uniquely pro-claimant nature of
the veterans’ disability compensation system,” are more than sufficient
to pass constitutional muster.175 Gambill’s attorney argued that allowing
the veteran to test the medical opinions of DVA clinicians in a formal
setting would produce more accurate adjudications.176 Judge Bryson
rejected this argument, stating that the mere probability a particular
procedure “is likely to produce [] accurate results . . . [does not permit us
to] invalidate the system devised by [the DVA] and blessed by
Congress.”177
Second, in Edwards, Judge Rader’s pithily written concurrence
warned “in Cushman, this court stepped beyond the bounds set by the
Supreme Court for property rights and due process protections.”178
Judge Rader’s opinion, referred to by one law professor as “cert. bait,”179
advocates a completely hands-off approach to procedural due process in
the veterans’ benefits context. However, the Edwards majority opinion
hinted that additional procedural safeguards may be appropriate for
veterans suffering from mental disabilities under Mathews balancing.180
Judge Rader effectively sidestepped Mathews balancing by refusing to
acknowledge that veterans’ benefits are due process property interests.181
Despite the shaky ground upon which Cushman seems to have
rested, it is otherwise certain that veterans’ benefits are property
interests under the Due Process Clause. Procedural due process
challenges will, over time, delineate exactly how much process is due by
way of Mathews balancing.
III. WHY IT ALL MATTERS: WOUNDED WARRIORS & THE MILITARY
Thus far, this Note has introduced three major ideas: (1) procedural
due process, (2) the military deference doctrine, and (3) the various
propositions in the Cushman v. Shinseki opinion. As discussed supra,
Part I.D, the military deference doctrine has no bearing on the DVA
disability benefits at issue in Cushman.182 However, the doctrine bears
heavily on disability determinations made by the DOD. This Note now
turns to the DOD’s disability compensation scheme—which has been

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 1315.
Id. at 1319-20.
Id. at 1320.
Edwards v. Shinseki, 582 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Lubbers, supra note 1, at 19.
Edwards, 582 F.3d at 1355.
Id. at 1357.
See supra Part I.D.
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insulated from procedural due process developments by the military
deference doctrine since inception.
The first proposition posed by this Note is that DOD disability
benefits are protected property interests under the Due Process Clause.183
This is where Cushman comes in. As discussed ad nauseum, the
threshold inquiry for any procedural due process analysis is determining
whether any property interest exists at all.184 As we also know, the
governing statutes determine whether or not there is a property
interest—not constitutional law.185 Thus, the following section presents
the baseline explanation of DOD disability benefits.
A. DOD Disability Benefits Explained
First, a general explanation of DOD disability benefits is in order.
The DOD has promulgated what is commonly known as a “disability
evaluation system” to adjudicate disability claims. This system is
promulgated under Chapter 61 of Title 10, United States Code, which
provides for the separation or retirement of military service members
“[u]pon a determination by the Secretary concerned that [the] member . .
. is unfit to perform the duties of [his/her] office, grade, rank, or rating
because of physical disability” aggravated or incurred during military
service.186 The Secretary of each military branch administers the
provisions of Chapter 61 and regulations promulgated by the Secretary
of Defense.187 Service members found unfit for duty are involuntarily
discharged from military service and, depending on their assigned
disability rating, may receive either severance pay or disability
retirement pay.188
The DOD awards severance pay to those service members with a
disability rating of 20 percent or less.189 Severance pay is a one-time,
lump sum payment based on the service member’s length of service and
base pay.190 Retirement pay is awarded to those service members with a

183. See supra Part I.
184. See supra Part I.A.
185. See supra Part I.A.
186. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1203, 1204, 1206 (2006).
187. See Id. §§ 1201-22.
188. See Id. § 1201 (permitting disability retirement pay if “the disability is at least 30
percent under the standard schedule of rating disabilities in use by the [DVA] at the time of
the determination”); Id. § 1203 (permitting disability severance pay if “the disability is less
than 30 percent under the standard schedule of rating disabilities in use by the [DVA] at the
time of the determination”).
189. Id.
190. Id.
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disability rating of 30 percent or more.191 When a service member is
awarded retirement pay, he or she is entitled to what is effectively a
lifetime pension, health insurance, privilege to enter military bases, and
utilize duty-free facilities located on military bases.192 In the vast
majority of cases, service members stand to gain much more from
retirement than they do from severance pay. It is important to note that
these benefits are separate and distinct from those provided by the DVA.
1.

Why are There Two Systems of Compensation?

The DOD and DVA separate systems of compensation can be
explained by the different functions of each agency. The DOD expressly
operates to “provide the military forces needed to deter war and protect
the security of [the United States].”193 An obvious corollary to the
DOD’s express mission, what service members call an “implied task,” is
ensuring the medical readiness of military personnel.194 The functional
byproduct of the DOD’s objectives, providing security to the United
States and maintaining personnel readiness, is the need to prematurely
discharge service members who, by virtue of some medical condition,
can no longer meet the requirements of military service. To facilitate
this function, the DOD implemented its own disability evaluation
system.195
On the other hand, the DVA purports to compensate veterans for
the impairments caused by service-connected disabilities.196 The DVA
exists solely for the benefit of veterans, and accordingly the DVA
disability process is more paternalistic than the DOD process.197 For
example, the DVA has a statutory duty to assist the veteran in
developing any claims for benefits.198 Individuals who were awarded
DOD disability benefits are eligible for DVA disability compensation,
but are generally prohibited from “double-dipping.”199 As a result, there
191. Id. § 1201.
192. CNA CORPORATION, FINAL REPORT FOR THE VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS
COMMISSION: COMPENSATION, SURVEY RESULTS, AND SELECTED TOPICS 177 (2007).
193. About the Department of Defense (DOD), THE OFFICIAL HOME OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, http://www.defense.gov/about/ (retrieved Oct. 5, 2011).
194. Id.
195. See infra Part III.A.3.
196. See 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2006). The DVA rates disabilities based on “the average
impairment in earning capacity resulting from such diseases and injuries and their residual
conditions in civil occupations.” 38 C.F.R. § 4.1 (2011).
197. The DVA is more “veteran-oriented” as they do not share the DOD’s burden of
ensuring the national security of the United States.
198. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (2011).
199. See 38 U.S.C. § 5305 (2006) (requiring the veteran to waive military disability
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is significant overlap between DOD and DVA disability
determinations.200 This raises a question as to why the DOD and DVA
have separate systems at all.201
2.

The Primary Difference Between the DOD & DVA Systems

The primary difference between the DOD and DVA disability
evaluation schemes is the distinct methods used for determining when a
disability is “compensable”—a threshold determination prior to the
actual “rating” of a disability. Generally, the DOD will only rate those
conditions which render a service member “unfit for duty,” while the
DVA rates all conditions where the veteran can show existence of a
current disability, the aggravation or onset of which is related to their
military service.202 Thus, the DOD only compensates service members
for conditions which impact their ability to perform their military duties,
a substantially higher bar than the DVA standard of compensating for all
military-related injuries. However, after the initial determination of
compensability, both departments utilize the same rating schedule to
award a disability percentage.203
Regardless of commands to utilize the same schedule, the two
agencies tend to reach different results in many instances.204 Consider
this question: of the service members receiving a 20 percent or less

retirement pay to receive DVA disability compensation). But see 10 U.S.C. § 1414 (2006)
(allowing concurrent receipt of DVA disability compensation and DOD disability retirement
pay where the member has at least twenty years of service).
200. CNA CORPORATION, supra note 192, at 178-80.
201. However, this question is well beyond the scope of this Note. For more on this
topic, see Thomas J. Reed, Parallel Lines Never Meet: Why the Military Disability Retirement
and Veterans Affairs Department Claim Adjudication Systems Are a Failure, 19 WIDENER
L.J. 57 (2009).
202. 10 U.S.C. § 1201; 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2006). The DOD defines “physical
disability” as:
Any impairment due to disease or injury, regardless of degree, that reduces or
prevents an individual’s actual or presumed ability to engage in gainful employment
or normal activity. The term “physical disability” includes mental disease, but not
such inherent defects as behavioral disorders, adjustment disorders, personality
disorders, and primary mental deficiencies. A medical impairment or physical
defect standing alone does not constitute a physical disability. To constitute a
physical disability, the medical impairment or physical defect must be of such a
nature and degree of severity as to interfere with the member’s ability to adequately
perform his or her duties.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 1332.38 E2.1.25 (2006)
[hereinafter DOD INSTRUCTION 1332.38] (implementing policies and procedures for service
member disability evaluation).
203. 10 U.S.C. § 1216a (2006 & Supp. 2011).
204. Id.
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rating from the DOD, how many received a 30 percent or greater rating
from the DVA? In 2007, a private contractor found that 61 percent of
service members receiving a rating of 20 percent or less received a rating
of 30 percent or more from the DVA.205
The rating discrepancy is only one example of apparent unfairness
in the DOD’s disability system. Further perusal of the Chapter 61
framework reveals a system that few, if any, service members could
navigate without specialized counsel.
3.

The DOD Disability Framework

The DOD disability process begins with referral, by the proper
authority,206 of a service member to a local Military Treatment
Facility.207 As a general matter, members are referred “when a question
arises as to the [member’s] ability to perform the duties of his or her
office, grade, rank, or rating because of physical disability.”208 The
member is then subject to a full medical evaluation by the local medical
facility, referred to as a Medical Evaluation Board (MEB).209 The
member cannot apply for disability evaluation in the sense that a veteran
would apply for veterans’ benefits. Referral to the PDES is involuntary
and the member has almost no control over the timing of such referral.210
In this infant stage of the process, the service member is effectively
quarantined from anything recognizable as a “combat unit.”211
205. CNA CORPORATION, supra note 192, at 184.
206. Usually a physician is the referring authority, but a service member’s commander
can also order a “fit-for-duty” exam if the commander believes the member is unable to
perform the duties of his/her rank, grade, or rating. See Army Regulation 635-40, Physical
Evaluation for Retention, Retirement, or Separation, §§ 4-6 to 4-8 (2006). This Note uses the
Physical Disability Evaluation System (PDES) regulations promulgated by the Department of
the Army to illustrate how the process operates at the service-level, in contrast to the broader
requirements imposed by Congress and DOD. The Department of the Navy promulgates their
own PDES regulations, see Department of the Disability Evaluation Manual 1850.4E (2002),
which is binding upon members of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps. The Department of
the Air Force also promulgates their own PDES regulations, see Air Force Instruction 36-3212
(2006), binding upon members of the U.S. Air Force.
207. Generally, “MTFs” are fully functional hospitals or medical clinics located on
military installations. MTFs operate under the command of a military officer.
208. Army Regulation 635-40 § 4-6.
209. Id. at §§ 4-9 to 10.
210. Army Regulation 40-400, Patient Administration, § 7-1 (2010).
211. In 2004, the Army instituted “Warrior Transition Units” to assist wounded and
disabled Soldiers. These units are a classic example of the Army’s affinity for centralizing
and isolating a particular “problem” group from the population of deployable units. Many of
these Soldiers suffer from PTSD and other combat-related ailments. Upon approval of
transfer to a Warrior Transition Unit, Soldiers are assigned new housing arrangements and
duties they are capable of performing despite their medical ailments. In what is easily
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Additionally, service members are seldom afforded counsel and are
rarely briefed on the gravity of the determination.212
Following referral, the MEB evaluates the service member’s
medical status. MEBs function to (1) document all of the service
member’s medical conditions and (2) determine if any of those
conditions fail medical retention standards.213 Each military service214
promulgates retention standards which delineate medical conditions that
may render the member unfit for military service.215 Generally, each
service’s medical retention standards contain a list of conditions that will
likely hinder a member’s ability to perform their military duties.216
The MEB does not make any determinations concerning the
member’s fitness or unfitness for duty.217 Rather, they “document a
classifiable as a commonplace oversight, the Warrior Transition Unit in Fort Benning,
Georgia housed Soldiers suffering from combat-related PTSD in barracks directly across the
street from a Basic Combat Training rifle range that was in use on a near-daily basis. New
Director: WTU Population Doubles in First Year, THE UNITED STATES ARMY (June 18,
2008), http://www.army.mil/article/10168/new-director-wtu-population-doubles-in-first-year/.
Many service members housed in Warrior Transition Units also find themselves in the
equivalent of a “holding pattern,” where their referral to PDES processing is delayed because
they have not reached an “optimal” level of treatment. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-08-1137, MILITARY DISABILITY SYSTEM: INCREASED SUPPORT FOR SERVICE
MEMBERS AND BETTER PILOT PLANNING COULD IMPROVE THE DISABILITY EVALUATION
PROCESS 8 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 GAO REPORT].
212. 2008 GAO REPORT supra note 211, at 17-18.
213. See Army Regulation 635-40 § 4-10; Army Regulation 40-400 § 7; Army
Regulation 40-501, Standards of Medical Fitness, § 3 (2010).
214. The term military service encompasses one branch of the “armed forces.” See 10
U.S.C. § 101(a)(4) (“The term “armed forces” means the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard.”).
215. This Note utilizes chapter 3 of Army Regulation 40-501 to illustrate how retention
standards operate in the MEB setting.
216. See Army Regulation 40-501 § 3. Military retention standards identify certain
medical conditions that are likely to:
a. Significantly limit or interfere with the Soldier’s performance of their duties.
b. May compromise or aggravate the Soldier’s health or well-being if they were to
remain in the military Service. This may involve dependence on certain
medications, appliances, severe dietary restrictions, or frequent special treatments,
or a requirement for frequent clinical monitoring.
c. May compromise the health or well-being of other Soldiers.
d. May prejudice the best interests of the Government if the individual were to
remain in the military Service.
Id. § 3-1. Thus, the retention standards are in line with PDES’s overall aim of ensuring the
medical readiness of military personnel and mitigating force protection issues.
217. “MEBs shall not state a conclusion of unfitness because of physical disability,
assignment of disability percentage rating, or the appropriate disposition under Chapter 61 of
10 U.S.C.” DOD INSTRUCTION 1332.38, supra note 202, at E3.P1.2.3. Cf. Army Regulation
40-400 § 7-1 (“Decisions regarding unfitness for further military duty because of physical or
mental disability are prerogatives of [Physical Evaluation Boards].”). But cf. Reed, supra note
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[member’s] medical status and duty limitations insofar as duty is
affected by the [member’s] status.”218 To accomplish this task, the
member receives a general physical examination219 and then, depending
on the member’s conditions, one or more specialized examinations by
medical specialists.220
The results of MEB threshold examinations are then summarized in
a document entitled the “Narrative Summary.”221 These documents
represent the culmination of the MEB stage and are arguably the most
important document produced in the process.222 Dictated by a physician
in the presence of the service member, the Narrative Summary provides
a medical snapshot of the service member to the Physical Evaluation
Board for purposes of determining fitness and, if applicable, proper
disability ratings. If a service member disagrees with the contents of the
NARSUM, they have a relatively new right to request impartial review
of the medical evidence.223
The MEB stage concludes with a classification of each of the
member’s conditions evaluated as either (1) failing or (2) not failing
medical retention standards.224 If none of the member’s conditions fail
medical retention standards, the MEB returns the member to duty.225 If
any conditions do fail medical retention standards, the MEB forwards
the case to the Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) for a determination of
fitness.226
The PEB is the second, and for some service members, the final
stage of the process.227 As a threshold observation, there are two types
201, at 113-14 (2009) (“[A] MEB votes on whether or not the service member's physical or
mental issues make the service member unfit for further military duty.”).
218. Army Regulation 635-40 § 4-10.
219. The initial MEB physical is akin to the physical examination required for entry in
to the military, known as an “accessions physical.”
220. Army Regulation 40-400 § 7-9.
221. Id.
222. “The Narrative Summary (NARSUM) . . . is the heart of the disability evaluation
system. Incomplete, inaccurate, misleading, or delayed NARSUMs may result in injustice to
the [service member] or to the [military].” Army Regulation 635-40 § 4-11.
223. Wounded Warrior Act, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1612(a)(2)(D), 122 Stat. 430, 441
(2008).
224. Army Regulation 40-400 § 7-22; Army Regulation 635-40 § 4-13.
225. See Army Regulation 40-400 § 7-1 (clarifying that not all MEBs result in referral
to the PEB). It is important to note the distinction between determining a member is fit for
duty and determining a member does not have any conditions which fail retention standards.
226. Army Regulation 635-40 § 4-13.
227. Service members whom are found unfit for duty and do not wish to challenge the
determinations of the informal Physical Evaluation Board are subsequently discharged in
accordance with applicable regulations. On the other hand, members found fit for duty may
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of PEBs: (1) the informal PEB, and (2) the formal PEB.228 “The first
and most important determination made by the PEB is whether the
[service member] is physically fit or unfit to perform the duties of the
[member’s] office, grade, rank, or rating.229 All other actions are
directly or indirectly tied to this one finding.”230
The PEB is composed of a three-member panel, at least one of
which is a medical officer.231 The informal PEB component which
considers a member’s case in the first instance, is intended to provide for
administrative efficiency in PDES determinations.232 Upon receipt of a
case, the informal PEB performs a multi-factor analysis of the member’s
case with respect to each medical condition found to fail retention
standards by the MEB.233
First, the informal PEB determines whether a particular medical
condition renders the member “physically fit or unfit to perform the
duties of [his or her] office, grade, rank, or rating.”234 If the condition is
attempt to appeal to a formal Physical Evaluation Board, but Congress has not guaranteed
these members any right to a full and fair hearing. The right to a formal Physical Evaluation
Board is only guaranteed for members facing separation or disability retirement. See 10
U.S.C. § 1214.
228. IPEBs can be summarized by their namesake, they are informal determinations to
foster administrative efficiency: “[Informal PEBs] conduct a documentary review without the
presence of the Service member for providing initial findings and recommendations.” DOD
INSTRUCTION 1332.38, supra note 202, at E3.P1.3.2. Formal PEBs, on the other hand, are
more trial-like. Formal PEBs are operate to fulfill the statutory requirement of 10 U.S.C. §
1214, which requires a member to be granted a full and fair hearing if facing separation or
retirement for disability. See 10 U.S.C. § 1214.
229. Army Regulation 635-40 § 4-19(d)(1).
230. Id. The DOD and services have gone to great lengths to outline the precise role of
the PEB. Id. § 4-17.
231. Id. § 4-17b.
232. Administrative efficiency in the PDES is paramount for ensuring military
personnel readiness. With too many service members in limbo, the DOD would find itself
dedicating too many resources to disability evaluation determinations. But this need for
administrative efficiency is tempered by the need for complete evaluation: “[i]nformal
procedures reduce the overall time required to process a case through the disability evaluation
system. The rapid processing intended by the use of informal boards must not override the
fundamental requirement for detailed and uniform evaluation of each case.” Id. § 4-20
(emphasis added).
233. Id. § 4-19.
234. Id. “Fitness for duty” is contingent on factors such as the member’s military
occupation, current duty assignment, rank, age, years of service, potential for limited duty
assignments, and commander’s recommendations. To illustrate:
One day, two Soldiers board an aircraft for a jump. The first is an [enlisted
infantryman]. The second . . . is [a finance officer]. They both hit hard on landing
and both twist their right knee. They are taken to the [local medical facility] where
they are found to have both torn the same ligaments in their right knee. The
orthopedist is amazed because they have the exact same condition. Well, after a
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not unfitting, the inquiry ends with respect to that condition. However,
if the condition is unfitting, the second question is whether the unfitting
condition is “compensable.”235 If the condition is not compensable, the
member will be discharged without benefits with respect to that
condition. However, if the condition is compensable, the informal PEB
will determine whether the disability is subject to various
enhancements236 as well as provide a disability rating for that condition
presumably in accordance with the corresponding VASRD provision.237
If the member does not agree with the findings of the informal
PEB, he or she is permitted to provide an informal rebuttal to the
findings.238 Moreover, if the member is found unfit for duty and does
not agree with the informal PEB findings, he or she has a statutory right
to a formal PEB.239 The formal PEB is composed of the same
individuals that considered the member’s case during the informal
PEB.240 To satisfy the “full and fair hearing” requirement of section
1214, the formal PEB is a trial-type proceeding and performs the same
analysis as the informal PEB.241

year of rehab after surgery, they both have recovered to the exact same degree.
They both still have painful knees that result in profile limitations on their duty
performance to include a “no” for the ability to carry a fighting load at least two
miles. For the . . . infantryman this is very likely an unfitting condition because he
needs to be able to carry a fighting load over more than 2 miles to reasonably
perform the duties of his grade and [military occupation]. However, the [finance
officer] has no such duty requirement. He can reasonably do his job without
rucking any distance whatsoever. . . . [h]e is likely to be fit. Two Soldiers, same
condition, but based on their grade and [military occupation], two different
outcomes as to fitness at the PEB.
Attorney Jason E. Perry, available at Fitness vs. Unfitness, PHYSICAL EVALUATION BOARD
FORUM (June 18, 2007), http://www.pebforum.com/site/threads/fitness-vs-unfitness.13/#post212 (last visited May 13, 2013).
235. Army Regulation 635-40 § 4-19. This question is where the informal PEB reviews
whether the condition was incurred during or aggravated by military service, was not the
result of willful neglect, intentional misconduct, etc. Essentially, the informal PEB is
confirming the member’s condition does not fall within any provision which would preclude
award of disability severance or retirement under Chapter 61.
236. Id. Conditions that are classified as “combat-related” may permit a federal income
tax exemption on disability severance or retirement pay received by the member. DOD
Instruction 1332.38, supra note 202, at E3.P5.2.2.
237. 10 U.S.C. § 1216a.
238. Army Regulation 635-40 § 4-20(f).
239. 10 U.S.C. § 1214.
240. The standard of review, as one can imagine, is highly deferential. In the judicial
setting, recusal would be in order. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate
judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.”).
241. Army Regulation 635-40 § 4-21(m).
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Once a member receives the formal PEB findings, the same options
are available as with the informal PEB: accept or deny the findings.
Where the member does not concur with the formal PEB determination,
a limited option of rebuttal is available.242 Any further relief sought by
the member is technically outside the DOD disability process.
IV. CALLING A SPADE A SPADE: CUSHMAN, MILITARY DEFERENCE,
AND DOD DISABILITY BENEFITS
This Note now proposes the following argument: (1) DOD
disability benefits, in the wake of Cushman, are properly classifiable as
property interests; (2) procedural due process challenges are, therefore,
permissible to challenge DOD disability determinations in certain
instances; (3) the military deference doctrine should not operate with
respect to these challenges, especially under the Mathews analysis of
“how much process is due?”
A. Why DOD Disability Benefits are Protected Property Interests
Cushman stands for the proposition that not only veterans currently
in receipt of veterans’ benefits hold a property interest therein, but that
applicants for veterans’ benefits also enjoy a property interest in
benefits.243 Precisely when an applicant acquires a property interest in
benefits is contingent on the statute authorizing the benefit, specifically,
“when” the applicant gains “legal entitlement” under the statute.
Generally, the degree of discretion allotted to an agency in awarding a
benefit is an important indicator in determining the existence of a
property interest.244 As Judge Calabresi has observed, “[t]o the extent
that . . . [the] law imposes ‘substantive predicates’ that limit the
decision-making of [program] officials, it . . . may confer a
constitutionally protected property right.”245 While the foregoing is
tempered by Supreme Court precedent,246 non-discretionary benefits
definitely inure a property right for applicants of benefits.
242. Formal PEB rebuttals are limited to: (1) alleging the findings were “based upon
fraud, collusion, or mistake of law,” (2) that the member “did not receive a full and fair
hearing,” and (3) “[s]ubstantial new evidence exists which . . . by due diligence, could not
have been presented before disposition of . . . the PEB.” Army Regulation 635-40 § 4-21(t).
243. Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290 1297-98 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
244. See supra Part I.A.
245. Lubbers, supra note 1, at 19 (quoting Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir.
2005)).
246. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1297 (“[A] benefit is not a protected entitlement if
government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.”) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
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It is not surprising then that a statute conferring “an absolute right
of benefits to qualified individuals” was also found to vest a property
interest in Cushman.247 This is a common-sense interpretation of the
law. When an applicant gains legal entitlement to a benefit, a
corresponding acquisition of a property interest must follow, otherwise
summary denial of benefits without any meaningful level of process
would be the order of the day.248 Indeed, the justification for this
principle is best illustrated by Cushman: “When Mr. Cushman was
injured while serving in a United States combat infantry battalion in
Vietnam, he acquired a legitimate claim of entitlement to veteran’s
disability benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1110.”249
Detractors of Cushman have presented a counter-argument to the
“absolute acquisition” argument—primarily in response to the
proposition that mere applicants enjoy a property interest. They have
proffered that “the Due Process Clause only applies to a VA benefit that
the claimant has already been awarded, as prior to such a determination
there is no property to take.”250 This is nothing short of slothful
induction—just as social security claimants “have paid into the
retirement system with an expectation of recovery of investments,”251
“veterans have . . . contributed their blood, sweat, and tears to defending
this country.”252 It follows then, that where social security claimants
enjoy “a legitimate expectation and reliance upon contributions . . . as
entitlements,”253 veterans ought to be able to expect a similar return on
their investment—an investment that is arguably beyond measure.254
While the Supreme Court may have explicitly reserved
consideration of the mere applicant issue,255 the government did not seek
247. Id.
248. “[T]hat due process does not apply at all to applicants for statutory benefits—
would . . . mean . . . it would be constitutional for the government to treat some applications
unfairly, shred half of them, throw some in the trash unread, or subject them to a process
tainted with corrupt practices.” Lubbers, supra note 1, at 17.
249. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1298.
250. Deutsch & Burriesci, supra note 145, at 221.
251. Edwards v. Shinseki, 582 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
252. Lubbers, supra note 1, at 19.
253. Edwards, 582 F.3d at 1358.
254. George Washington stated “[t]he willingness with which our young people are
likely to serve in any war, no matter how justified, shall be directly proportional to how they
perceive the Veterans of earlier wars were treated and appreciated by their nation.” U.S.
Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, S.13, Fulfilling Our Duty to America’s Veterans Act
of 2005 (2005).
255. Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The Supreme Court
has not . . . resolved . . . whether applicants for benefits, who have not yet been adjudicated as
entitled to them, possess a property interest in those benefits.”).
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certiorari in Cushman and Judge Rader’s “cert. bait” in Edwards became
a nullity when the plaintiff in that case decided against appeal.256
Suffice it to state, the overwhelming majority of courts faced with the
question of whether mere applicants harbor a property interest in
benefits have answered in the affirmative.257 Indeed, the fact that
“[e]very [regional] circuit to address the question . . . has concluded that
applicants for benefits . . . may possess a property interest in the receipt
of [benefits],”258 leads to an obvious conclusion that “Cushman seems to
be in the mainstream.”259
However, whether a mere applicant enjoys a property interest is a
question not necessarily material in determining whether DOD disability
benefits are property interests–but it is certainly instructive. Chapter 61
of Title 10, the statute creating entitlement to DOD disability benefits,
established an absolute right to benefits.260 However, military disability
benefits are awarded only for medical conditions deemed to render a
service member “unfit” for further military service.261 As discussed
supra, Part III, the military has tremendous discretion in determining a
service member’s “fitness for duty”—how does this discretion bear on
the proposition that DOD disability benefits are property interests?262
It is arguably beyond doubt that the “fitness for duty” discretion
carries little weight in this context. Unilateral PEB discretion only exists

256. “In any event, neither Cushman nor Edwards will be making it to the Supreme
Court.” Lubbers, supra note 1, at 19.
257. See Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1297-98; see also Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115
(2d Cir. 2005); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559 (6th Cir. 2004); Mallette v. Arlington Cnty.
Employees’ Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 1996); Nat’l Ass’n of
Radiation Survivors v. Derwinski, 994 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1992); Gonzalez v. Sullivan,
914 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1990); Daniels v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128,
1132 (8th Cir. 1984); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 1982); Kelly v. R.R.
Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489 (3d Cir. 1980); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 120-21 (9th Cir.
1979); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir. 1978).
258. Kapps, 404 F.3d at 115.
259. Lubbers, supra note 1, at 19.
260. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held:
Despite the presence of the word ‘may’ in [Chapter 61], in Sawyer we determined
that the Secretary has no discretion whether to pay out retirement funds once a
disability is found qualifying. Thus, we held that the statute is money-mandating
because when the requirements of the statute are met—i.e., when the Secretary
determines that a service member is unfit for duty because of a physical disability,
and that disability is permanent and stable and is not the result of the member’s
intentional misconduct or willful neglect—the member is entitled to compensation.
Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1174-75 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted).
261. DOD INSTRUCTION 1332.38, supra note 202, at E3.P1.3.1.
262. See Army Regulation 635-40 § 4-19(d)(1).
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at the “fitness for duty” inquiry.263 Determining the degree, extent, and
ultimate disposition of the disabled service member must be in
accordance with the objective criteria in Chapter 61, Title 10 United
States Code and the applicable provision of the VASRD.264 Where a
service member has been found to be unfit for duty, the necessary
implication is that he or she has at least one medical condition which
renders him or her unfit for duty. Thus, at least following an unfit for
duty determination, service members and veterans become identically
situated to the extent that adjudication of their benefits is subject to nondiscretionary statutory rules. Apart from the criteria of Chapter 61, the
rating schedule—by application of § 1216a of Title 10, United States
Code—is effectively another statutory criterion in the DOD disability
scheme. In a sense, the DOD disability determination ought to be
perceived as binary: (1) fitness for duty (absolute discretion) (2) rating
and award (no discretion).
It seems that some “unfit” service members are undoubtedly
beyond mere applicants in the procedural due process context.265 There
is no per se application for military disability benefits; rather, initial
referral to the military disability evaluation system is involuntary.266 To
the extent a service member is facing disability discharge as the result of
a discretionary determination, it can hardly be argued that they harbor a
mere “abstract need . . . desire . . . or unilateral expectation” of
benefits.267 If anything, these service members are more akin to veterans
already in receipt of benefits, as the threshold determination of
entitlement has already been established. This characterization likely
satisfies Cushman critics.268
The inevitable conclusion of this comparison is that DOD disability
benefits ought to be classified as property interests, acquired by a service

263. The term “compensable disability” is defined by the DOD as “[a] medical
condition determined to be unfitting by reason of physical disability and which meets the
statutory criteria under Chapter 61 of reference (b) for entitlement to disability retired or
severance pay.” DOD INSTRUCTION 1332.38, supra note 202.
264. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1222 (2006); 10 U.S.C. § 1216a (Supp. 2011) (requiring
the Secretary concerned to utilize VASRD).
265. However, the mere applicant argument is material where a member, for example,
receives a 20% rating—which creates an entitlement to severance pay under Chapter 61. If
the member disagrees, the question becomes whether the member has a property interest in
military retirement pay, which requires a 30% disability rating. In this scenario, the service
member is similarly situated to the mere applicant.
266. See Army Regulation 40-400, Patient Administration, § 7-1 (2010).
267. Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
268. See supra text accompanying note 256.
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member once they are adjudicated as “unfit” for further military service.
Deeming a service member unfit for duty is functionally equivalent to
removing them from the military. Thus, these service members hold
what can be characterized as a “greater” property interest in benefits
than the veteran-applicants at issue in Cushman and its progeny.
Of course, classifying DOD benefits as property interests is the
“easy part.”269 Presuming DOD disability benefits are property interests,
there is still the proverbial “elephant in the room”—the military
deference doctrine—as it may affect Mathews balancing.
B. Military Deference, Mathews balancing, & DOD Disability Benefits
The extent of process due to disabled service members is arguably
greater than that of veteran-applicants: “[t]he extent to which procedural
due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to
which he may be condemned to suffer grievous loss.”270 Service
members facing involuntary disability discharge are facing not only loss
of livelihood, but the loss of their way of life. While Congress has
expressly provided for “fairness” in military disability adjudications,
“process which is a mere gesture is not due process.”271
1.

Abdicating the Military Deference Doctrine

This Note has illustrated how the military deference doctrine
presents an obstacle for any due process challenge addressing a military
determination, especially in times of conflict.272
The author
acknowledges that military determinations concerning “fitness for duty”
neatly fall within the realm of personnel decisions implicating force
readiness and national security.273 However, once a service member is
adjudged “unfit for duty” he or she is effectively removed from the
military.274
Consider this: let us presume that DOD disability determinations
are—for purposes of discretion and purpose—binary and distinct. The
second determination, implicating Chapter 61 and the disability rating
schedule, is a mere benefits determination.
Coupled with the

269. Miller, supra note 44.
270. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
271. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1297 n.1. “No member . . . may be retired or separated for
physical disability without a full and fair hearing if he demands it.” 10 U.S.C. § 1214 (2006).
272. See supra Part I.C.
273. See supra Part I.C.
274. See supra Part III.
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observations that “unfit” members are no longer part of the national
defense apparatus and the DOD utilizes the same criteria for rating
disabilities as the DVA, there is simply no basis to assert that the
military is performing some vital national security function. Where is
the need to “alleviate [an] uncommon potential to burden the Executive
at a time of ongoing military conflict[?]”275 How does a disability rating
implicate “[t]he complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force[?]”276
Simply put, DOD disability benefits are awarded in the same
manner as DVA benefits and Social Security benefits. The military,
when making such determinations, is not performing one of its
traditional functions—which would otherwise implicate the military
deference doctrine. There is a counter-argument that some “unfit”
service members are still within the military corpus, namely those who
are challenging the determination of “unfitness” itself. However, a
challenge to the discretionary determination of “fitness” is distinct from
the benefits inquiry that follows the “fitness” question.
Where a service member challenges the disability rating assigned
after a determination of unfitness, he or she has conceded his or her
ultimate fate with respect to military service: that it has ended. If DOD
disability benefits are property interests, the only issue is whether a
member was deprived of a property interest without due process of law.
The nature of the property interest is contingent on the member’s
assigned disability rating—objective criteria under the statute.
Accordingly, the procedural due process inquiry should proceed to
Mathews balancing without the military deference doctrine pervading the
analysis.
2.

Mathews balancing & DOD Disability Benefits

One notable downfall of Mathews balancing is “its focus on
questions of technique rather than on questions of value.”277 This focus
arguably “generates an inquiry that is incomplete [and] unresponsive to
the full range of concerns embodied in the due process clause.”278 This
downfall may likely exacerbate due process challenges of disabled
service members to an extent greater than that of the military deference
275. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
276. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981) (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413
U.S. 1, 10 (1973)).
277. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 30
(1976).
278. Id.
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doctrine.
Acknowledging the shortcomings of Mathews wholly
questions the propriety of vindicating DOD disability benefits as
protected property interests. There is a germane proposition in Judge
Bryson’s proposed doctrine of judicial non-interference in the veterans’
benefits context: both veterans and military disability benefits are
governed by a massively complex and congressionally authorized
statutory scheme. The DOD scheme is concededly littered by rules
facially advantageous to the service member. Under what circumstances
can procedural due process challenges “fix” these systems?
Subjecting DOD disability determinations to Mathews balancing in
the face of an orderly system may be completely futile—at least to the
extent a reviewing court focuses on “technique.”279 Consider § 1216a—
a statute requiring the military to utilize the DVA’s rating schedule as
interpreted by the DVA, and more importantly, prohibiting deviation
from the schedule.280 Additionally, 10 U.S.C. § 1214 commands that no
member may be separated from service without a “full and fair hearing”
if demanded.281 The procedural safeguards are already in place—under
Mathews, what can the court do?
Mathews balancing is, of course, an ad hoc determination. The
ultimate result will likely depend on the particular facts of the case, the
relief sought, and the forum considering the case. Perhaps refinement of
Mathews in the post-Cushman world of veterans’ benefits will provide a
meaningful analogy for procedural due process in the military disability
context. Whatever the case, a paradigm shift is in order.282
C. Policy Justifications
The practical operation of the DOD disability evaluation system has
been the source of several problems requiring patchwork legislative
remedy in the past few years.283 The DOD has long enjoyed “[a] strong,
but rebuttable, presumption that administrators of the military . . .

279. Id.
280. 10 U.S.C. § 1216a.
281. 10 U.S.C. § 1214.
282. “Any standard premised simply on preexisting legal rights renders a claimant's
quest for due process . . . either unnecessary or hopeless.” Mashaw, supra note 277, at 50.
Additionally, the court’s recognition of “individual dignity” in procedural due process
challenges seems proper: “those who obtain [benefits] have encountered one of the politically
legitimate hazards to self-sufficiency in a market economy. The recipients . . . are entitled to
society’s support. Conversely, the denial of [a] . . . claim implies that the claim is socially
illegitimate, and the claimant, however impecunious, is not excused from normal work force
status.” Id. at 51.
283. These remedies are of questionable utility in a procedural due process context.
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discharge their duties correctly, lawfully, and in good faith.”284 This
presumption has created over-confidence in the military’s ability to
properly adhere to law. While Congress has purported to act, its reactive
approach to these problems simply does too little, too late.
Consider § 1216a, codified in 2008.285 Section 1216a requires the
DOD to utilize the DVA’s rating schedule when rating a service
member’s disability.286 Until the enactment of § 1216, the military
utilized its own, unauthorized, rating criteria,287 despite explicit
instructions to utilize the DVA rating schedule for nearly half a
century.288 In 2007, a private research firm found that of 849 service
members rated by the DOD at 20% or less for Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD), 749 received a rating of 30 percent or greater from the
DVA.289 Thus, had the military properly followed the DVA rating
schedule, nearly 90 percent of those 849 service members would have
been awarded disability retirement pay for their PTSD. Under a
Mathews analysis, these findings arguably evidence the type of
inaccurate results prompting judicial intervention.290
Another example is found in § 1214a. Section 1214a was another
reactive measure to a DOD practice colloquially characterized as “they
are fit for duty, but unsuitable for military service.”291 This practice
occurred when a service member, despite suffering from a disability,
was found fit for duty by the PEB. When the service member returned
to duty with medical limitations—namely, the inability to deploy outside
the United States—he or she was simply a liability.292 During the height
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DOD needed individuals able to
deploy to the Middle East. In order to “clear the rolls,”293 the DOD
284. Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (1979).
285. 10 U.S.C. § 1216a.
286. Id.
287. The Department of the Army used “Issue and Guidance” documents which
“summarized” the VASRD for application in disability determinations.
288. See Hordechuck v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 492, 495 (1959).
289. CNA CORPORATION, supra note 192, at 189. Under 38 C.F.R. § 4.129, a
provision of the VASRD, if the PTSD is severe enough to render a member unfit for military
duty, then a minimum temporary rating of 50% must be assigned.
290. While DVA ratings are not binding on the DOD, the inconsistencies discovered in
this report would likely play a powerful role under the second Mathews prong.
291. 10 U.S.C. § 1214a.
292. While members found fit for duty have no statutory right to a FPEB under 10
U.S.C. § 1214, they must still have their conditions accommodated by the military once they
are returned to duty.
293. “Clear the rolls” is military lingo most relevant to a commander’s perpetual duty to
ensure his or her entire military unit is able to deploy. All service members are “on the rolls”
(that is, on the official list of individuals composing a given unit), but those facing disability
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administratively discharged service members with duty limitations
precluding deployment. These discharges were rationalized on the basis
that these service members were “unsuitable” for military service. This
practice was manifestly contrary to the DOD’s own regulations294 and
occurred for over a decade before Congress enacted § 1214a.295
Needless to say, these members were certainly deprived of something
without due process of law.296
The third and final example considered is the enactment of the
Physical Disability Board of Review (PDBR) under § 1554a.297 The
PDBR is nothing less than a governmental concession of the military’s
inability to lawfully adhere to statutes and regulations. The board was
specifically established to review PEB ratings of 20% or less for service
members discharged between September 31, 2001 and December 31,
2009.298 The PDBR functions to ensure that such cases were decided on
the basis of “accuracy and fairness,” carrying the obvious implication
that at least some of the covered PDES ratings are either inaccurate,
unfair, or both.299 Government officials have stated that 77,000 service
members are eligible to have their cases reviewed by the PDBR.300 At
current staffing levels, the PDBR will need over 200 years to adjudicate
all eligible cases.301 The PDBR itself seems vulnerable to a procedural
due process challenge, aside from the implied violations precipitating its
creation.302
evaluation are automatically barred from deployment. Junior officers charged with companysized units receive tremendous pressure from their superiors to clear their “rolls” of any nondeployable members.
294. The ability of a member to deploy, standing alone, cannot serve as a basis for a
finding of unfitness for duty. DOD INSTRUCTION 1332.38, supra note 202, at E3.P3.4.1.3.
295. Board for the Correction of Naval Records (BCNR) decision 8271-98 (1998).
Section 1214a provides that the military may not administratively discharge a member for the
same condition for which he was evaluated for by the PEB during PDES processing. See 10
U.S.C. § 1214a.
296. 10 U.S.C. § 1216.
297. 10 U.S.C. § 1554a.
298. See 10 U.S.C. § 1554a. “The Physical Disability Board of Review, or PDBR, was
legislated by Congress and implemented by the Department of Defense to ensure the accuracy
and fairness of combined disability ratings of 20% or less assigned to service members who
were discharged between September 11, 2001 and December 31, 2009.” About PDBR,
PHYSICAL DISABILITY BOARD OF REVIEW (PDBR),
http://www.health.mil/About_MHS/Organizations/MHS_Offices_and_Programs/PDBR.aspx
(last visited May 13, 2013).
299. About PDBR, supra note 298.
300. 2008 GAO REPORT, supra note 211, at 78.
301. Id.
302. “[T]he possible length of wrongful deprivation of . . . benefits [also] is an
important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private interests.” Mathews
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CONCLUSION
Introducing procedural due process to military disability
adjudications is a difficult, but necessary, course of action. The reactive
whims of Congress and judicial inability to alter the status quo under the
military deference doctrine have proved ineffective. The relative
indifference of the legislature to the constitutional rights of service
members requires immediate judicial intercession.
Simply put, the judiciary’s present threshold for pain in the context
of military regulations exceeds that of the political branches or of the
public. If that equilibrium were to change, and the political branches
became unconcerned with protecting the legitimate liberty interests
of military personnel, the existence of a doctrine that involves a
substantive review of the challenged regulations might result in an
303
occasional legal victory for the individual litigant.

The equilibrium has changed. Cushman presents a clear analogy
for taking the first step in the right direction: classifying military
disability benefits as protected property interests. Such classification
would at least confirm the service member’s ability to enjoin any
unconstitutional conduct perpetrated by the military.304
But acquiring meaningful relief is another question.305 If the
military deference doctrine does not apply to DOD disability benefits,306
a cognizable Bivens action may arise with a characterization of DOD
disability benefits as property interests.307 At the least, threat of a Bivens
action may deter the Secretary of Defense from testing the boundaries of
service members’ constitutional rights in disability adjudications.308 At
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976) (quoting Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389
(1975)).
303. O’Connor, supra note 12, at 310-11 (emphasis added).
304. “This Court has never held, nor do we now hold, that military personnel are barred
from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military
service.” Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983).
305. This question is beyond the scope of this Note.
306. Recall the proposed bifurcation of the PEB’s determination. See supra Part IV.B.
307. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). Bivens actions have been held to be unavailable “for injuries that arise out of or are in
the course of activity incident to [military] service.” United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669,
684 (1987) (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)). However, the
unavailability of Bivens actions, in this context, is premised on the availability of alternative
remedial schemes provided by Congress—veterans’ benefits—and a proposition that smacks
of the military deference doctrine: “the insistence . . . with which the Constitution confers
authority over the Army, Navy, and militia upon the political branches . . . counsels hesitation
in our creation of damages remedies in this field.” Stanley, 483 U.S. at 682.
308. Bivens actions are filed against the federal official, not the United States. Punitive
damages are available.
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the most, damages may be sought.
Broadly speaking, judicial
recognition of due process in DOD disability adjudications would spark
a long-overdue departure from prioritizing military autonomy above the
constitutional rights of service members.
Dennis M. Carnelli*

*

J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2013. I dedicate this Note to
my mother Kimmarie, who taught me, in life, the virtue of humility, and in death, that
adversity is the vehicle for realizing potential. Thank you Meredith, my wife and loyal
opposition, for always being there to challenge and support me. You continually inspire me to
be a better person.

